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Abstract
Recommendation systems are extremely popular tools for
matching users and contents. However, when content
providers are strategic, the basic principle of matching users
to the closest content, where both users and contents are mod-
eled as points in some semantic space, may yield low so-
cial welfare. This is due to the fact that content providers
are strategic and optimize their offered content to be recom-
mended to as many users as possible. Motivated by modern
applications, we propose the widely studied framework of fa-
cility location games to study recommendation systems with
strategic content providers. Our conceptual contribution is the
introduction of a mediator to facility location models, in the
pursuit of better social welfare. We aim at designing media-
tors that a) induce a game with high social welfare in equi-
librium, and b) intervene as little as possible. In service of
the latter, we introduce the notion of intervention cost, which
quantifies how much damage a mediator may cause to the so-
cial welfare when an off-equilibrium profile is adopted. As a
case study in high-welfare low-intervention mediator design,
we consider the one-dimensional segment as the user domain.
We propose a mediator that implements the socially optimal
strategy profile as the unique equilibrium profile, and show a
tight bound on its intervention cost. Ultimately, we consider
some extensions, and highlight open questions for the general
agenda.
1 Introduction
Publishing, blogging, and content creation are fundamental
to data science. Indeed, many of the AI-based recommen-
dation systems aim at matching users with data created by
content providers. While at first glance this task might be
viewed as purely computational, a major topic that should
be tackled is the participants’ incentives.
To illustrate such incentives, consider the following exam-
ple inspired by Hotelling’s seminal work (Hotelling 1929).
A blogging recommendation system recommends users with
relevant blogs. Two players (i.e., publishers/blog owners)
write one blog each. For simplicity, assume every blog is
represented as a point along the [0,1] segment, e.g., the mix
between news and articles in the blog. Thus, each player
selects a point in that segment. A set of users, where user
preferences are uniformly distributed along the same seg-
ment, approach the recommendation system to have a rec-
ommendation for one blog. The social cost of the users is de-
fined as the sum of absolute distances between preferences
and recommended contents. As Hotelling demonstrates, the
only pure Nash equilibrium (PNE hereinafter) is obtained
when both players select the center of the segment, produc-
ing identical content. The social cost of the PNE profile is
far from optimum, and users effectively suffer from strate-
gic behavior of the players.
The difference between this example and the one consid-
ered by Hotelling in his seminal work is that in modern ap-
plications, users are not explicitly exposed to players’ con-
tent, but rather the recommendation system serves as a medi-
ator for matching users with content. However, despite their
commercial success, current recommendation systems basi-
cally (very efficiently) implement the above principle: users
are matched with the “closest” content. A prominent exam-
ple is the vector space model for document retrieval in re-
sponse to a user query (Salton, Wong, and Yang 1975). In-
deed, the recommendation system is just a tool for having
the users “choose” the offered content most similar to their
taste.
1.1 The connection to facility location games
Facility location games (Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse
1992; Brenner 2010; Fournier and Scarsini 2014), which are
extensively studied in economics, operations research and
computer science, portray recommendation systems with
strategic content providers incredibly well, due to the na-
ture of recommendation systems described above. This is
true since in many (and perhaps even most) recommenda-
tion systems, the computational task of matching users with
content is carried out by modeling both into a joint metric
space. In the vast majority of facility location games liter-
ature, it is assumed that users are attracted to their nearest
facility1. In the example above, this amounts to each user
selecting the closest blog to her preference.
Given a strategy profile, i.e., the selection of each player
for a particular mix of news and articles in her blog, the best
(in terms of social cost) recommendation system matches
each user with the nearest blog to her preference. However,
the way the recommendation system operates affects the
strategic behavior of players, and more precisely redefines
player payoffs. As a result, it may induce a game with a dif-
1Some exceptions appear in Subsection 1.4.
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ferent set of PNE, potentially with improved social welfare
(i.e., the social cost with negative sign). This calls for the de-
sign of a mediator that takes into account strategic behavior
of players, aiming at achieving low social cost in equilib-
rium.
1.2 Our agenda: High welfare low intervention
mediator design
Our conceptual contribution is the introduction of a media-
tor to facility location models, in the pursuit of better out-
comes for recommendation systems with strategic content
providers. We aim at designing mediators that a) induce a
game with high social welfare in equilibrium, and b) inter-
vene as little as possible.
To better describe the latter, let NIME be the No Inter-
vention Mediator, namely the default mediator that displays
each user with its nearest content. A question in this regard
is whether a mediator that intervenes with the process can
do better than NIME, in terms of social welfare. Clearly,
one can design a mediator that dictates each player which
content to select, thereby forcing the players to any desired
strategy profile. Consider theDICTmediator that operates as
follows: it commands each player to play a particular strat-
egy, and if she disobeys DICT directs no user to her content.
Indeed, by adopting DICT the mediator designer is guaran-
teed to have any specific strategy profile as the unique PNE
of the induced recommendation game. However, this is a
huge and potential harmful intervention, and doing so may
lead to poor performance in case that specific profile is not
materialized. Crucially, this can happen even when the play-
ers are rational, but some of the assumptions the mediator
holds regarding the players are violated, e.g., players have
constraints on their strategy space, slightly different payoff
functions, they are able to form coalitions and so on.
A major aspect of our approach is the quantification of
intervention cost. Given the above intuition, we define the
intervention cost as the maximal increase in user social cost,
which might be caused if the players use arbitrary strategies
(i.e., select arbitrary contents). Formally, letM denote a me-
diator, S be the set of all strategy profiles, s ∈ S be a strategy
profile, and let SC(M,s) denote the social cost under M
and s. The intervention cost of a mediator M is defined as
sups∈S{SC(M,s) − SC(NIME,s)}. Evidently, NIME has
a zero intervention cost and high social cost, and serves as
a benchmark for low intervention cost. On the other hand,
DICT has high intervention cost but low social cost (when
dictating the socially optimal strategy profile), and it serves
as a benchmark for low social cost. The main challenge in
our agenda is the design of a mediator with low intervention
cost and low social cost in equilibrium.
1.3 Our results
This paper presents a case study in high welfare low inter-
vention mediator design. The mathematical model we adopt
in service of the above is based on pure location Hotelling
games (Hotelling 1929), with the [0,1] segment. Section 2
presents a formal mathematical model for the setting, stating
former widely-known results for pure Hotelling games (or
equivalently, recommendation games with NIME as a medi-
ator) on the segment with uniform user distribution. In addi-
tion, in Subsection 2.3 we define the intervention cost, and
bound the intervention cost of DICT.
The main technical results of the paper appear in Section
3. We introduce the Limited Intervention Mediator, LIME.
We provide the intuition behind it, as well as a thorough ex-
ample to illustrate how it operates. We then prove that the
game induced under LIME possesses a unique PNE, which
attains the minimal social cost. Then, we establish upper and
lower bounds on its intervention cost, which are almost tight.
We show that not only is its intervention cost lower than that
of DICT for every n, it is also O( 1
n
). Since DICT and LIME
have the same social cost under (the unique) PNE profile,
the results given in this section provide a highly encourag-
ing answer to the challenge given above.
We subsequently study three natural extensions of the ba-
sic setting. First, we discuss neutral mediators. Informally,
a mediator is neutral if when two players swap their strate-
gies, the mediator’s direction also swaps. We show an im-
possibility result for neutral mediators that aim at optimiz-
ing the social cost in the two-player case. Second, we design
a mediator with a configurable intervention cost. This me-
diator is important where e.g. one seeks to design a media-
tor that minimizes social cost but is penalized for interven-
tion (similarly to regularization in machine learning mod-
els). We show that for some cases of n, it induces Pareto
optimal solutions for the setting. Third, we consider non-
uniform user distributions. We propose the General Lim-
ited Intervention Mediator, which depends on the distri-
bution quantiles solely. We then prove that it always in-
duces a game with a unique PNE. This becomes even more
striking when one recalls that PNE may not exist in facil-
ity location games (with no mediator) (Osborne 1993), and
are generally hard to characterize (see e.g. (Shilony 1981;
Ewerhart 2015)). We bound its intervention cost (for the
uniform distribution), and show that its intervention cost is
lower than that of DICT.
From an algorithmic perspective, we deal with one-
dimensional problems. This may sound disappointing, but
recall that we intentionally focus on relatively simple, struc-
tured problems, and that this domain is extremely well-
studied in the facility location literature. Due to space con-
straints, the proofs are deferred to the appendix.
1.4 Related work
The notion of a mediator in a game-theoretic setting was
first proposed by Aumann in his seminal work on Correlated
Equilibrium (Aumann 1974). In the setting Aumann consid-
ers, a mediator may send signals to the players, where the
signal is designed to drive the players to achieve better pay-
offs. The work of Shoham and Tennenholtz (1995) grants
stronger capabilities to the mediator, by setting constraints
on participants’ behavior. A different type of mediator, con-
sidered by Monderer and Tennenholtz (2004), is allowed to
change player payoffs. As in our work, the mediator is de-
signed to “force” players into playing some desired subset of
their strategy sets with minimal interference with the payoff
functions. Unlike the above work, where the mediator inter-
venes with the outcome of the game to improve the social
welfare of the (strategic) players, in the model we study the
mediator intervenes in order to improve the social welfare of
the (non-strategic) users, as we describe next.
The work of Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz, and Kurland (2017)
introduces a formal model of adversarial information re-
trieval. Each author (a player) has several strategies, where
each strategy corresponds to a document she can pub-
lish. Each pair of document-query (where a document is a
player’s strategy and a query represents a user) has a score,
termed “quality”, which measures the extent to which the
document is relevant to the query. The mediator (i.e., search
engine) provides each user the document with the highest
quality relative to her query, among those selected under
the corresponding strategy profile. In their model, every au-
thor seeks to maximize a function that takes into account the
number of queries for which her document is the most rel-
evant (representing users directed to that document by the
mediator) along with the document-query quality.
As Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz, and Kurland show, display-
ing each user with the document with the highest quality
(i.e., no intervention) may lead to deteriorated content and
low user utility. They argue against no intervention, and
claim that introducing randomization into the mediator leads
to an overall user utility that transcends that of no interven-
tion at all. Nevertheless, they neither a) provide a systematic
approach for doing so under PNE profiles; nor b) show that
a PNE always exists. Recently, Ben-Porat, Rosenberg, and
Tennenholtz (2018) claim in favor of no intervention in a
similar model, and show that no intervention policy leads to
convergence of any better-response dynamics; thus, a PNE
is guaranteed to exist. Importantly, Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz,
and Kurland (2017) as well as Ben-Porat, Rosenberg, and
Tennenholtz (2018) do not consider the task of mediator de-
sign for better outcomes.
The work of Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz (2018a) is the
first to consider mediator design in recommendation systems
with strategic content providers, in a mathematical model
that extends that of Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz, and Kurland
(2017) and Ben-Porat, Rosenberg, and Tennenholtz (2018).
They highlight several fairness-related properties that a me-
diator should arguably satisfy, along with the requirement of
PNE existence. They show that the no-intervention media-
tor satisfies the fairness-related properties, but may lead to
a game without PNEs. Then, they design a mediator that is
based on the Shapley value (Shapley 1952), prove it satisfies
the fairness properties and the game it induces always pos-
sesses a PNE. On the other hand, Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz
(2018a) take an axiomatic approach, and do not address user
utility as one of the axioms. Moreover, they show that the
user utility under their proposed mediator can be arbitrarily
low. In contrast, this paper stems from a user utility opti-
mization point of view, and so are the solution concepts it
proposes.
Several extensions of pure location Hotelling games have
been suggested recently, assuming non-deterministic user
behavior (Feldman, Fiat, and Obraztsova 2016; Shen and
Wang 2017; Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz 2017). More pre-
cisely, users do not select their nearest facility, but rather
have a reaction function, mapping every strategy profile to
a distribution over player indices, possibly skipping all op-
tions. The work of Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz (Ben-Porat
and Tennenholtz 2017) associates users with a reaction func-
tion motivated by decision theory literature, and shows that
the induced facility location game always possesses a PNE,
regardless of the metric space in which users are embed-
ded. Shen and Wang (2017) show a result of similar flavor
for a different reaction function. Interestingly, every reaction
function can be implemented as a mediator. Unlike this line
of research, in this paper (as in the information retrieval set-
ting) the mediator is required to direct users to facilities w.p.
1, i.e., skipping all facilities is not an option. We elaborate
on the latter in Section 5.
Finally, a different line of research in the algorithmic
game theory literature (Nisan et al. 2007) is the study of fa-
cility location, in the context of approximate mechanism de-
sign without money (Procaccia and Tennenholtz 2009). That
literature deals with the case where only one entity dictates
the place of a facility (or several facilities), while user pref-
erences are their private information and are strategically re-
ported (see,e.g., (Schummer and Vohra 2007)). In contrast,
the setting we consider is a full information setting.
2 Mathematical Formulation
In this section we introduce our formal mathematical model.
The non-cooperative game we consider is formally defined
as follows:
1. A continuous density function g over the unit interval[0,1], representing user distribution.
2. A set of players [n] = {1,2, . . . , n}, where the pure2 strat-
egy set of player i ∈ [n] is Si = [0,1]. It will sometimes
be convenient to say that player i has/owns a facility in
si if the strategy she adopts is si. The set of all strategy
profiles is denoted by S def= ∏ni=1 Si.
3. A mediator M is a mapping from the set of strategy pro-
files and users to the set of distributions over player in-
dices, i.e., M ∶ S × [0,1] → ∆([n]). Given a pure strat-
egy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S, a user t ∈ [0,1] and a
player i ∈ [n], we denote byM(s, t)i the probability thatM will send user t to player i under the strategy profile
s.
4. Given a pure strategy profile s ∈ S, the payoff of each
player i is the proportion of usersM directs to her facility.
Namely, pii(s) = ∫ 10 M(s, t)i ⋅ g(t)dt. Each player aims
at maximizing her payoff.
According to these assumptions, every game is fully de-
scribed by the number of players, the mediator, and the user
distribution function, .i.e., G (n,M, g). In addition, unless
stated otherwise, g is the uniform distribution; hence, for
convenience, we shall use the notationG (n,M) to describe
the n-player game induced by selectingM as a mediator.
2In this paper we discuss pure strategy profiles only.
Social Cost (former results) Intervention Cost (Sections 2 and 3)
Number of players Optimal NIME, best PNE NIME, worst PNE In(DICT) In(LIME)
n = 2 1/8 1/4 1/4 1/4 3/16
n = 3 1/12 no PNE exists ≥ 0.278 ∈ (0.236,0.278)
n ≥ 4 1/4n 1/4(n−2) 1/4⌈n/2⌉ ≥ 1/2 − 3/4n + 1/4n2 ∈ ( 2n−4
n2
, 2n−3.5
n2
)
Table 1: A summary of former results known for pure location Hotelling games, and the results of this paper. The social cost is
given for three scenarios: the optimal social cost, for the profile on (see Subsection 2.2); the best PNE in terms of social cost
under NIME; and the worst PNE in terms of social cost under NIME. Under both DICT and LIME, the induced game possesses
a unique PNE, with social cost of 1/4n, namely the optimal social cost. For these mediators, the table reports the bounds on the
intervention cost (see Subsection 2.3) as obtained in Sections 2 and 3.
Equilibrium For a vector v = (v1, . . . vn), we denote by
v−i def= (v1, . . . vi−1, vi+1, . . . vn) the vector that does not
contain the i-th coordinate of v.
A strategy profile s ∈ S is called a pure Nash equilibrium
(PNE hereinafter) if for every i ∈ [n] and every s′i ∈ Si it
holds that pii(s′i,s−i) ≤ pii(s). We say that player i has a
beneficial deviation under a strategy profile s = (si,s−i) if
there exists s′i ∈ Si such that pii(s′i,s−i) > pii(s).
2.1 Social cost
We remark that any mediator always directs a user to one of
the facilities selected by the players; thus, the player payoffs
sum to one under every strategy profile s, i.e., ∑ni=1 pii(s) =
1. Consequently, we view the social cost of the users as the
public welfare. In the blogging example given above, we
consider the distance between a user’s preferences and the
actual attribute of the blog as the extent to which she is sat-
isfied with that blog. Clearly, this perspective is identical to
the one considered by (Hotelling 1929), albeit the motiva-
tion of (Hotelling 1929) is the physical world. Motivated by
transportation cost, Hotelling (Hotelling 1929) defines the
cost a customer (i.e., a user) suffers as the distance he has
to travel to reach his nearest facility. This notion is naturally
extended to the mediated setting.
Definition 1 (Social cost). Given a strategy profile s and a
mediator M, the social cost is the sum of distances users
must travel to reach their recommended facility. Formally,
SC ∶ S → R≥0 is defined by
SC(M,s) = ∫ 1
0
n∑
i=1M(s, t)i ⋅ ∣si − t∣ g(t)dt.
2.2 No intervention mediator
We denote by NIME the No-Intervention Mediator. Namely,
NIME sends every user to his nearest facility, breaking ties
uniformly. Formally,
NIME(s, t)i = 1∣si−t∣≤mini′ ∣si′−t∣∑nj=1 1∣sj−t∣≤mini′ ∣si′−t∣ .
By implementing NIME we recover the non-mediated ver-
sion of the setting, where under every strategy profile each
user is attracted to his nearest facility, as is in pure location
Hotelling games. Given n, we denote by on = (on1 , . . . , onn),
where oni
def= 2i−1
2n
, the sequence of n-socially optimal loca-
tions. These are optimal in the following sense:
Claim 1 (e.g. (Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz 2018b)). It holds
that SC(NIME,on) = infs∈S SC(NIME,s) = 14n .
It turns out that this is the unique socially optimal profile,
up to renaming the players. Moreover, for any fixed strat-
egy profile, it is apparent that employing NIME results in
the lowest possible social cost w.r.t. that particular profile.
Namely,
Claim 2. For every strategy profile s and every mediatorM, it holds that SC(NIME,s) ≤ SC(M,s).
However, as we show later, the set of PNE depends on
the mediator; hence, a PNE under NIME may not be in
equilibrium under another mediator, and vice versa. Since
we care about the social cost in equilibrium, this turns out
to be crucial. Pure location Hotelling games (or equiva-
lently G(n,NIME) for any n) have been studied exten-
sively in the past decade, and its equilibrium structure is
widely known (see, e.g. (Eaton and Lipsey 1975; Fournier
and Scarsini 2014; Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz 2018b)). For
completeness, we state the following well-known results for
G(n,NIME):● The only PNE for n = 2 is (1/2, 1/2);● There is no PNE for n = 3, although a mixed NE exists
(Shaked 1982);● For n ∈ {4,5} a unique PNE exists (up to renaming the
players). If n ≥ 6, there are infinite PNEs.
For an elaborated discussion of these results, the reader is re-
ferred to (Eaton and Lipsey 1975). Table 1 summarizes the
social cost for NIME. Notice the social cost under the worst
PNE, which is a factor of two of the optimal feasible social
cost.
2.3 Intervention cost
Indeed, a mediator that implements the n-socially optimal
locations as a PNE can greatly decrease the social cost. By
intervening with the market and using a basic punishing
mechanism, one can drive the players to play any arbitrary
profile, by intervention that makes that profile the only PNE.
We denote by DICT the mediator3 that dictates the strat-
egy profile on, the n-socially optimal locations. Namely,
DICT operates as follows: given a strategy profile s, let
A = {i ∶ si = oni }. If A is not empty, DICT(s) directs every
3One can think of other dictatorship mediators as well, by vary-
ing the punishment in case of disobedience.
user t to its nearest facility from those of the players in A,
i.e., DICT(s, t)i = 1i∈A ⋅ NIME(s ∩A, t)i. Otherwise, if A
is empty, it directs every user to a player selected at random.
It is apparent that
Claim 3. Consider G(n,DICT) for any n ≥ 2. The unique
PNE is on.
However, sometimes the strategy profile being material-
ized is not the equilibrium profile. As elaborated above,
a mediator intervening with the system to decrease social
cost may hence have implicit negative effects. It is therefore
highly desired to design a mediator that not only drives the
players to a “good” equilibrium (in terms of social cost), but
also does not intervene “that much”. To quantify the extent
to which a mediator intervenes with the natural market, we
introduce the following measure.
Definition 2 (intervention cost). The intervention cost of a
mediator M is the maximum difference between the social
cost ofM and that of NIME (i.e., the No-Intervention Medi-
ator), when the maximum is taken over all strategy profiles.
Formally,
In(M) def= sup
s=(s1,...sn)∈S {SC(M,s) − SC(NIME,s)} ,
where the subscript n emphasizes the dependency on the
number of players.
Indeed, the intervention cost captures the measure of in-
tervention by the mediator. By definition of NIME, it has an
intervention cost of zero, i.e., In(NIME) = 0 for every n. In
addition, the intervention cost as defined above also demon-
strates the great amount of intervention employed by DICT.
To illustrate it, consider the consequences of a strategy
profile other than on being materialized under DICT. Take
for example the two-player game,G(2,DICT), and the strat-
egy profile s = (s1, s2) = (0,1). This profile represents the
case where the offered contents are varied to the extreme.
Both players defy their commands; thus, DICT sends every
user to a facility selected uniformly at random, and every
user travels a distance of 1/2 in expectation. Summing over
all users we get, SC(DICT,s) = 1/2. The social cost un-
der no mediation is SC(NIME,s) = 1/4; hence, the inter-
vention cost of DICT is lower bounded by SC(DICTs) −
SC(NIME,s) = 1/4. As we show in the appendix, for n = 2
this is not only a lower bound but rather the actual interven-
tion cost of DICT.
In fact, this profile can be extended to any n-player game,
showing that In(DICT) ≥ 1/4 for any n. However, using a
different construction we show a much tighter bound that
depends on n. More precisely,
Lemma 1. For any n ≥ 3, it holds that In(DICT) ≥ 12 −
3
4n
+ 1
4n2
.
Due to its high intervention cost (among other properties)
using DICT as a mediator may not be the best solution. In
the next section we devise a mediator that implements on as
the unique equilibrium, but unlike DICT has a substantially
low intervention cost.
Algorithm 1: Limited Intervention Mediator
Input: A strategy profile s and a user t
Output: A location in s
1 if ∃i ∈ [n − 1] such that t ∈ ( 2i−1
2n
, 2i+1
2n
) then
2 l ← s ∩ [0, 2i−1
2n
] ,r ← s ∩ [ 2i+1
2n
,1]
3 if l ≠ ∅ and r ≠ ∅ then
4 return NIME(l ∪ r, t)
5 else if l ≠ ∅ or r ≠ ∅ then
6 w.p. 1 −  return NIME(l ∪ r, t), otherwise
return random(s, t)
7 else // all facilities are inside ( 2i−1
2n
, 2i+1
2n
)
8 return NIME(s, t)
9 else // t is outside ∪i∈[n−1] ( 2i−12n , 2i+12n )
10 return NIME(s, t)
11 Function random(s, t):
12 return an element from s u.a.r.
3 Limited Intervention Mediator (LIME)
In this section we take advantage of the game structure to
devise a mediator that encourages the players to select the
n-socially optimal locations on, but intervenes substantially
less than DICT. This is done by exploiting the equilibria
structure under no mediation. According to the characteri-
zation of PNE profiles given in (Eaton and Lipsey 1975),
under NIME a profile can be in equilibrium only if its pe-
ripheral facilities (i.e., leftmost and rightmost facilities) are
paired. In addition, if beneficial deviations do not exist, the
proportion of users coming from the left/right of any facility
cannot be greater than the total proportion of users served by
any other facility.
Consider the Limited Intervention Mediator described in
Algorithm 1, and referred to as LIME hereinafter for abbre-
viation. The intuition behind LIME is the following: between
every two locations that belong to on, we construct a poten-
tially intervened interval (PII). The users in every PII are
not directed to a facility located in the same PII, but rather
to the closest facility outside of it. In addition, if a PII does
not have a facility located from its left or from its right (ex-
clusive or), the users in that PII are sent to a random player
w.p. , where  > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant.
To facilitate understanding of the LIMEmediator, we pro-
vide the following example, which is further illustrated in
Figure 1.a.
Example 1. Consider G(4,LIME), and the strategy profile
s = (1/16, 4/16, 10/16, 12/16). User t1, located in 0.5/16, is di-
rected by LIME to player 1’s facility in 1/16, since t1 is out-
side the PIIs (Line 10). User t2, who is located in 3/16, is
inside the PII (2/16, 6/16). Notice that this PII has a facility
from its left and a facility from the right. Namely, accord-
ing to the if condition in Line 3, r = s ∩ [6/16,1] ≠ ∅, and
l = s ∩ [0, 2/16] ≠ ∅; thus, t2 is directed to his nearest fa-
cility outside (2/16, 6/16), which is 1/16 (Line 4). User t3 is
inside the PII (6/16, 10/16), and is therefore directed to his
nearest facility outside this PII, player 3’s facility in 10/16
(PIIs are open intervals, and this facility lies in the exterior of(6/16, 10/16)). User t4 is inside (10/16, 14/16), and this PII does
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Figure 1: Three strategy profiles for G(4,LIME). The blue (dotted) segments represent potentially intervened intervals (PIIs),
and the numbered circle are the locations selected by the corresponding players. Sub-figure (a) visualizes Example 1. Sub-
figure (b) exemplifies a case where all players locate their facilities in the PII (6/16, 10/16). In this case, LIME directs every
customer outside the PIIs to his nearest facility; every customer in (6/16, 10/6) is also directed to her nearest facility (Line 8
of Algorithm 1); and a customer inside (2/16, 6/16) or (10/16, 14/16) is directed to his nearest facility w.p. 1 − , and with the
remaining probability to a facility selected uniformly at random (Line 6). The unique PNE of this game (due to Theorem 1) is
demonstrated in Sub-figure (c).
not have a facility from its right (i.e., r = s∩ [14/16,1] = ∅);
thus, w.p. 1 −  LIME directs him to the facility in 10/16, and
with the remaining probability he is directed to a facility se-
lected uniformly at random (Line 6).
The only event not covered by Example 1 is the case
where all the facilities are located in the same PII, as illus-
trated in Figure 1.b.
3.1 Pure Nash equilibrium
We now show that LIME is carefully constructed to miti-
gate players’ incentives. In particular, we show that on is
the unique PNE of G(n,LIME). First, we show that under
any PNE, players are not encouraged to locate their facilities
in PIIs.
Lemma 2. Consider G(n,LIME) for any n ≥ 2. If s is an
equilibrium profile, then sj ∉ ( 2i−12n , 2i+12n ) for every j ∈ [n]
and i ∈ [n − 1].
Next, we leverage Lemma 2 to show that there is a
unique equilibrium under LIME, which is composed of the
n-socially optimal locations, i.e., on. The case of n = 2 is an
interesting exception and is therefore discussed separately in
Subsection 4.1.
Theorem 1. Consider G(n,LIME) for any n ≥ 3. The
unique PNE (up to renaming the players) is on.
See Figure 1.c for illustration. Importantly, Theorem 1
holds for any  < 1/2, and implies that on is an exact PNE of
G(n,LIME) and not an approximated PNE. In addition, un-
der the profile on all the facilities are outside the PIIs; hence,
every user is directed to his nearest facility. Consequently,
Corollary 1. Consider G(n,LIME) for any n ≥ 3.
The unique PNE, on, attains the optimal social cost,
SC(LIME,on) = 1
4n
.
Therefore, the social cost of LIME under the PNE profile
matches the optimal (see Table 1).
3.2 Intervention cost
Having demonstrated that LIME obtains the optimal social
cost in the (unique) equilibrium, we now claim that its in-
tervention cost is low. By definition of the LIME mediator,
it suffices to consider users inside PIIs only, as users outside
PIIs are directed to their nearest facility; hence, they do not
contribute to the intervention cost. First, we lower bound its
intervention cost.
Lemma 3. For any n ≥ 3, it holds that In(LIME) ≥ 2n−4n2 .
More precisely, the bound is (1 − 
2
) ( 2n−4
n2
), which in-
creases as  decreases. The expression given in Lemma 3
is obtained by taking  to zero. Next, we move on to upper
bounding its intervention cost.
Theorem 2. For any n ≥ 3, it holds that In(LIME) ≤
2n−3.5
n2
.
The proof of Theorem 2 assumes for simplicity that  (in
Line 6 of Algorithm 1) is arbitrarily small. Notice that the
upper bound almost matches the lower bound. We summa-
rize the intervention cost of LIME in Table 1. Observe that
not only does LIME intervene less than DICT, but also its
intervention cost diminishes in a 1/n scale, similarly to the
optimal social cost (which is 1/4n).
4 Extensions
Beyond the main analysis of the paper given in the previous
sections, we find it important to examine the three following
extensions.
4.1 Neutral mediators
Dilemmas other than intervention cost may arise when im-
plementing a mediator. To illustrate such dilemmas and in-
tertwine our recommendation games with social choice the-
ory, we analyze the two-player game. As Theorem 1 shows,
on is the unique PNE for n ≥ 3. In G(2,LIME), however,
LIME does not induce a game with a unique PNE.
Proposition 1. Consider G(2,LIME). A strategy profile(s1, s2) is a PNE if and only if (s1, s2) ∈ { 14 , 34} × { 14 , 34}.
Notice that the selection of the socially optimal locations
remains a PNE, similarly to greater values of n, but this
PNE is not unique. To clarify the intuition behind the lat-
ter phenomena, consider the profile (1/4, 1/4). According to
Line 6 in Algorithm 1, LIME directs all users in the seg-
ment (1/4, 3/4) to a random player w.p. . Under this profile,
random direction collides with directing these users to their
nearest facility; hence, the randomness LIME employs for
breaking symmetry is not enough and other tools should be
applied. In fact, this problem can be easily solved by adding
a lexicographic tie breaker in case both players select the
same location. When augmented to LIME, this tie-breaker
induces a game with the socially optimal locations as the
unique PNE.
Indeed, our notion of intervention cost is not affected
by such tie-breaking intervention. However, the mediator
should treat players fairly, in some sense of the word. This
fact is meaningful with respect to the generality of our
agenda, since it introduces other considerations that involve
the players rather than the users, borrowing ideas from so-
cial choice theory. The most immediate characterization of
fairness in our setting is through the notion of neutrality.
Formally, a mediatorM is neutral if for every i, j ∈ [n] and
s = (s−{i,j}, si, sj) it holds that pii(s) = pij(s−{i,j}, sj , si).
Noticeably, the DICT mediator is not neutral, while the
LIME mediator and all other mediators discussed in the pa-
per and the appendix are neutral. The inability of LIME to
handle the two-player game then becomes apparent: it turns
out that for every neutral mediator that induces a game with
a PNE, there is a PNE when both players select the same lo-
cation (see the proof in the appendix). So, no neutral media-
tor implementing the socially optimal locations as a unique
PNE exists for n = 2, while for n ≥ 3 we show LIME does
precisely that under low intervention cost.
4.2 Configurable intervention cost
In some situations it might be beneficial to control the
amount of intervention. A mediator may offer a tradeoff
between social cost in equilibrium and intervention cost.
Namely, we devise a parameterized mediator, where its pa-
rameter determines a desired intervention cost. The media-
tor attains the desired intervention cost but suffers some in-
crease in its social cost in equilibrium (compared to the op-
timal one). For some values of n we show decisive positive
results for the applicability of such a mediator in creating
desired tradeoffs. This extension is deferred to the appendix.
4.3 Non-uniform user distribution
The results obtained for LIME do not hold for general user
distribution, since players may have beneficial deviations.
However, the case of non-uniform user distribution is ap-
pealing, especially given the fact that PNEs are hard to char-
acterize (see, e.g., (Shilony 1981; Ewerhart 2015)) or may
not even exist (Osborne 1993). In this subsection we devise
a mediator for general user distribution, showing initial re-
sults for this setting as well. Let g be an arbitrary continu-
Algorithm 2: GLIME
Input: A strategy profile s, a user t
Output: A location in s
1 ai ← q2i−1/2n for i ∈ [n − 1]
2 if ∃i ∈ [n] such that t ∈ (ai, ai+1) then
3 l ← s ∩ [0, ai] ,r ← s ∩ [ai+1,1]
4 if l ≠ ∅ and r ≠ ∅ then
5 w.p. 1
2
return NIME(l, t), otherwise return
NIME(r, t)
6 else if l ≠ ∅ or r ≠ ∅ then
7 w.p. 1 −  return NIME(l ∪ r, t), otherwise
return random(s, t)
8 else
9 return NIME(s, t)
10 else
11 return NIME(s, t)
ous function supported in the [0,1] segment, and denote by
G(n,M, g) the game induced by the mediator M, n play-
ers and g as the user distribution function. Let qa be the
a-th quantile of g. Consider the General Limited Interven-
tion Mediator described in Algorithm 2, and referred to as
GLIME hereinafter for abbreviation. GLIME operates sim-
ilarly to LIME, but carries out two things differently. First,
it incorporates the quantiles of g instead of those of the uni-
form distribution (on defined earlier). The other difference
is given in Line 5. Instead of directing users in PIIs to their
nearest facility outside that PII, it directs such users w.p. 1/2
to the nearest facility right of the PII (if such exists), and
with the remaining probability to the nearest facility left of
the PII. Importantly, GLIME induces games with a unique
PNE, which is highly desired.
Lemma 4. Consider G(n,LIME, g) for any n ≥ 3 and gen-
eral density function g. The unique PNE (up to renaming the
players) is s = (q2i−1/2n)ni=1.
Next, we bound the intervention cost of GLIME. Since
the analysis for general distributions is highly challenging,
we leave it for future work and only focus on its intervention
cost under the uniform distribution.
Proposition 2. For any n ≥ 2, it holds that In(GLIME) ≥
1
4
− 1
2n
+ 1
2n2
.
Indeed, while the intervention cost of GLIME is greater
than that of LIME, it is better than that of DICT.
Lemma 5. For every n, In(DICT) > In(GLIME).
5 Discussion
Another interesting solution concept that can be employed,
if the domain permits it, is to allow the mediator to direct
users in some cases with w.p. less than 1. Namely, to skip the
players offers and avoid producing a recommendation. Ben-
Porat and Tennenholtz (2018a) implement this idea while
adopting an axiomatic approach to player fairness, and in-
troduces a mediator that induces a PNE for games with any
user space (e.g., k-dimensional space or even non-metric
space). However, they do not discuss user welfare. This sug-
gests one should seek mediators that balance user welfare
and player welfare simultaneously, hopefully by not inter-
vening too much.
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A Omitted proofs from Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1. Let δ > 0 be an arbitrary small constant, and let sδ = (sδ1, sδ2, . . . , sδn) denote a strategy profile such that
sδ1 = 12n and sδi = 2i−12n + δ for i ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Since s1 = on1 , all users are directed to s1; hence,
SC(DICT,sδ) = 1
2
( 1
2n
)2 + 1
2
(1 − 1
2n
)2 = 1
2
− 1
2n
+ 1
4n2
.
In addition, due to the continuity of the social cost, SC(NIME,sδ) = SC(NIME,on) + O(δ) where O(δ) approaches 0 as δ
decreases; Therefore,
SC(DICT,sδ) − SC(NIME,sδ) = 1
2
− 3
4n
+ 1
4n2
−O(δ).
Finally, In(DICT) = sup
s∈S {SC(DICT,s) − SC(NIME,s)}≥ lim
δ→o+ {SC(DICT,sδ) − SC(NIME,sδ)}= lim
δ→0+ (12 − 34n + 14n2 −O(δ)) = 12 − 34n + 14n2 .
B Omitted proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 2. Let s be an arbitrary profile, and assume sj ∈ (oni , oni+1) holds for some j and i. For simplicity, we assume
that  < 1
3
. In addition, for every strategy profile s, let (s) denote the expected amount of users directed according to Line 6 of
LIME (i.e. sent w.p.  to a random player), and notice that (s) < .
We prove the lemma by showing that player j must have a beneficial deviation. We proceed by an exhaustive case analysis:
• If both oni and o
n
i+1 are occupied under s: player j gets only randomly-sent users; thus, by moving to oni+1 her payoff strictly
increases.
• If exactly one of oni , o
n
i+1 is occupied under s (w.l.o.g. oni ): we have two sub-cases. If s∩ (oni+1,1] ≠ ∅, the player controlling
the rightmost facility in (oni , oni+1) can improve her payoff if she deviates to oni+1.
Else, if s ∩ (oni+1,1] = ∅, let w.l.o.g. sj be the rightmost location under s,
pij(s) = 1
2n
+ n − i − 1
n
(1 − ) + (s)
n
.
Let s′j = oni+1. It holds that
pij(s−j , s′j) = 12n + n − i − 1n (1 − ) + 12n + (s−j , s′j)n > pij(s).
• If both of oni , o
n
i+1 are empty under s: we have three sub-cases.
1. If sj has both left and right neighbors outside (oni , oni+1): Let j′ denote a player with the leftmost facility in (oni , oni+1). We
now show that j′ has a beneficial deviation. If the facility of player j′ is lone, then she can increase her payoff by deviating
to oni . Otherwise, if player j
′s facility is paired, let α and β denote the user mass served by the facilities in sj′ from left
and right correspondingly. If the facility of player j′ has a right neighbor inside (oni , oni+1), then β = 0 ≠ α, and she could
deviate to oni and increase her payoff. Alternatively, if her facility does not have a right neighbor inside (oni , oni+1), then
pij′(s) = α+β2 , and by deviating to one of {oni , oni+1} she could get at least
max{α + 1
2n
,β + 1
2n
} > pij′(s).
2. If sj has only left (symmetric for right) neighbor outside (oni , oni+1): Let j′ denote a player with the leftmost facility
in (oni , oni+1). If her facility has a right neighbor inside (oni , oni+1), then she can increase her payoff by deviating to oni .
Otherwise, it does not have a right neighbor inside that interval. If her facility is lone, she can again increase her payoff
by deviating to oni . If her facility is paired, let α and β denote the user mass served by the facilities in sj′ from left and
right correspondingly, and let γ denote the amount of randomly-directed users she obtains. Notice that pij′(s) = α+β2 + γ.
However, by deviating to one of {oni , oni+1} she could get at least
max{α + 1
n
+ γ, β + 1
2n
+ γ − 
n2
} > pij′(s).
3. Else, all the facilities are inside (oni , oni+1). If all the facilities are located in the same point, the payoff of each player is 1n .
By deviates to one of {oni , oni+1}, player j can get max{ 2i−12n , 2i+12n }, which is greater than 1n for every i ∈ [n−1]. Otherwise,
if the facilities are scattered over two points or more inside the interval, let j′ denote the player with the rightmost facility.
Clearly, she can increase her payoff by deviating to oni+1.
We conclude that if s in a PNE profile, then all PIIs are free of facilities.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let s = (s1, . . . sn) be a profile such that s1 ≤ s2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ sn, let oni = 2i−12n for i ∈ [n] and assume
s ≠ (on1 , . . . , onn) = on and that s is in equilibrium. The proof consists of several steps, where in each step we further characterize
s, relying on the fact that it is a PNE. Finally, we show that s must be on.
Step 1: Under s, every player gets exactly 1
n
. Otherwise, there exists a player j with payoff less than 1
n
. Notice that on ∖ s ≠ ∅
since s ≠ on; thus, there exists a free location in on, and player j has a beneficial deviation: if she deviates to that location her
payoff becomes greater or equal to 1
n
.
Step 2: It holds that s ∩ ∪n−1i=1 (oni , oni+1) = ∅. This follows immediately from Lemma 2.
Step 3: It holds that s ∩ [0, on1 ) = ∅ and s ∩ (onn,1] = ∅. Otherwise, assume by contradiction that s ∩ [0, on1 ) ≠ ∅ (symmetric
for the other argument), and denote by j a player such that sj ∈ [0, on1 ). If player j’s facility is paired (namely, there is another
facility of different player in sj), these two facilities must obtain the same user mass from both sides, or otherwise she has a
beneficial deviation. However, if this is true, her payoff is sj < 12n (with, perhaps, an additional epsilonn ), which contradicts Step
1. If player j’s facility is lone, we have two sub-cases. If s−j ∩[0, on1 ] = ∅ (i.e. no other facility is located in the interval [0, on1 ]),
player j can increase her payoff by deviating to on1 . Else, if s−j ∩ [0, on1 ] ≠ ∅, then there is a facility in the segment [0, on1 ] that
attracts a user mass of at most 1
2n
, which contradicts Step 1.
Step 4: We have learned so far that under s all the facilities are located in a subset of the socially optimal locations on. In this
step we show that if there exists i ∈ [n−1] such that oni is not occupied, then oni+1 must be occupied with more than one facility.
First, assume that there exists i ∈ [n − 1] such that both oni and oni+1 are not occupied. In this case, any player that moves to
oni obtains a payoff that is strictly greater than
1
n
. Second, if there exists i ∈ [n − 1] such that oni is not occupied, and oni+1 is
occupied with a lone facility, then the corresponding player obtains a payoff that is strictly greater than 1
n
. The mirror argument,
which holds symmetrically, implies that for every i ∈ {2, . . . n}, if oni+1 is not occupied then oni is occupied with more than one
facility. Together, it means that for every i ∈ {2...n−1}, if oni is not occupied, then oni−1 and oni+1 must be occupied with multiple
facilities.
Step 5: Both on1 and o
n
n are occupied. Otherwise, assume that o
n
1 is not occupied (symmetric for o
n
n). Since o
n
2 must be occupied
with k ≥ 2 facilities (Step 4), we have two options:
• If on ∖ {on1} = s, i.e. the only empty location in on under s is on1 , then there exists a player that gets strictly greater than 1n
(her share plus 
n
). This in the only place in the proof that requires n ≥ 3.
• Else, if there is i ∈ {3, . . . , n} such that oni ∉ s, one of the players in on2 can move her facility to oni and get a payoff that is
strictly greater than 1
n
(her share plus 
n
).
Step 6: To obtain a contradiction, we must show that each location of on is occupied with a facility under s. Let αmul denote
the number of locations in on with multiple facilities under s. In addition, let αempty denote the number of locations in on
which are not occupied with facilities under s. By the way we defined αmul and αempty , it holds that αmul ≤ αempty .
On the other hand, Step 5 suggests that on1 and o
n
n must be occupied, and Step 4 implies that if o
n
i is not occupied for
i ∈ {2...n − 1}, then oni−1 and oni+1 must be occupied with multiple facilities. As a result, αmul ≥ αempty + 1, which is clearly a
contradiction.
We obtained s = on, as required.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let n ≥ 3, and let 0 < δ < 1
2n
be an arbitrary constant. denote sδ = (sδ1, . . . sδn) such that for every player
index i ≤ ⌈n
2
⌉, sδi = 12n + δ, and sδi = 2n−12n − δ otherwise if ⌈n2 ⌉ < i ≤ n. To ease notation, let SCA(LIME,sδ) denote the social
cost when restricted to the users in a A ⊂ [0,1] only, and similarly for SCA(NIME,sδ). Due to the LIME operates, it follows
that
SC(LIME,sδ) − SC(NIME,sδ) = SCA(LIME,sδ) − SCA(NIME,sδ)
where A = ( 1
2n
, 3
2n
) ∪ ( 2n−3
2n
, 2n−1
2n
). More elaborately, LIME coincides with NIME for every user outside of A, and hence it
suffices to examine the social cost of the users in A only.
Under LIME, every user t ∈ ( 1
2n
, 3
2n
) covers a distance of 2n−1
2n
− t − δ. By integrating over all the users in ( 1
2n
, 3
2n
) we get
∫ 3/2n
1/2n (2n − 12n − δ − t)dt = [(2n − 12n − δ) t − t22 ] ∣
3/2n
1/2n= (2n − 1
2n
− δ) 3
2n
− 9
8n2
− (2n − 1
2n
− δ) 1
2n
+ 1
8n2= 2n − 3
2n2
− δ
n
. (1)
In addition, w.p.  every user in the interval is served by a random facility, since the PII ( 1
2n
, 3
2n
) does not have a facility from
its left (Line 6 of Algorithm 1). s contains only two distinct locations; thus, w.p. ⌈n2 ⌉
n
LIME directs every t ∈ ( 1
2n
, 3
2n
) asNIME.
Due to symmetry (of the uniform distribution), the users in ( 2n−3
2n
, 2n−1
2n
) cover the same distance. Overall,
SCA(LIME,sδ) = (1 − 
2
)(2n − 3
n2
− 2δ
n
) + 
2
SCA(NIME,sδ). (2)
On the other hand, under NIME and the profile sδ , the users in ( 1
2n
, 3
2n
) travel a total distance of
∫ 1/2n+δ
1/2n ( 12n + δ − t)dt + ∫ 3/2n1/2n+δ(t − ( 12n + δ))dt
= [( 1
2n
+ δ) t − t2
2
] ∣1/2n+δ
1/2n + [ t
2
2
− t(1
2
+ δ)] ∣3/2n
1/2n+δ
= 1
2
( 1
2n
+ δ)2 − 1
4n2
− δ
2n
+ 1
8n2
+ 9
8n2
− 3
2n
( 1
2n
+ δ) + 1
2
( 1
2n
+ δ)2
= ( 1
2n
+ δ)2 − 1
8n2
− δ
2n
+ 3
8n2
− 3δ
2n
= ( 1
2n
+ δ)2 + 1
4n2
− 2δ
n= 1
2n2
− δ
n
+ δ2.
A symmetric argument applies for the users in ( 2n−3
2n
, 2n−1
2n
) ; thus
SCA(NIME,sδ) = 1
n2
− 2δ
n
+ 2δ2. (3)
By combining Equations (2) and (3) we get
SCA(LIME,sδ) − SCA(NIME,sδ) = (1 − 
2
)(2n − 4
n2
− 2δ2) . (4)
The proof is completed by taking the limit,
In(LIME) = sup
s∈S {SC(LIME,s) − SC(NIME,s)} ≥ limδ→0+ (SC(LIME,sδ) − SC(NIME,sδ)) = (1 − 2)(2n − 4n2 ) .
C Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. Let oni = 2i−12n for i ∈ [n], and denote
Is
def= {j ∈ [n − 1] ∶ s ∩ (onj , onj+1) ≠ ∅} , As def= ⋃
j∈Is (onj , onj+1) .
By definition4 of LIME, it suffices to examine all users t such that t ∈ As; hence, it holds thatIn(LIME) = sup
s∈S {SC(LIME,s) − SC(NIME,s)}
= sup
s∈S {∫t∈As n∑i=1LIME(s, t)i ⋅ ∣si − t∣dt − ∫t∈As mini′∈[n] ∣s′i − t∣dt} . (5)
4to ease readability, we omit the analysis of user LIME directs to random facilities, as written in the body of the paper.
Let
f(s) def= ∫
t∈As
n∑
i=1LIME(s, t)i ⋅ ∣si − t∣dt − ∫t∈As mini′∈[n] ∣s′i − t∣dt.
We proceed by showing that f(s) ≤ 2n−3.5
n2
for every s ∈ S.● First, we analyze the cases of ∣Is∣ = 0 and ∣Is∣ = 1. Line 10 in Algorithm 1 implies that for every s such that ∣Is∣ = 0,
LIME operates exactly as NIME; hence, f(s) = 0 for such profiles. In case ∣Is∣ = 1, denote the only element in Is by j. If
s∩(onj , onj+1) = s, then due to Line 8 in Algorithm 1 LIME operates asNIME, and hence f(s) = 0. Otherwise, s∩(onj , onj+1) ≠ ∅,
and LIME directs all the users in (onj , onj+1) to their nearest facility outside that interval (Line 4). Since we wish to bound f , we
can w.l.o.g. assume that s ∖ (onj , onj+1) contains a single facility, as otherwise f can only be smaller; thus, denote the location
of the only facility outside (onj , onj+1) by x. It holds that
f(s) = ∫
t∈(onj ,onj+1)
(∣t − x∣ −min
si∈s ∣si − t∣)dt ≤ ∫
t∈(onj ,onj+1)
∣t − x∣dt − 1
4n2
.
Due to monotonicity, the worst case (i.e., highest value of f ) is obtained for x = 1 and j = 1, or equivalently x = 0 and j = n−1;
thus,
f(s) ≤ ( 1
n
)2 1
2
+ 1
n
(1 − 3
2n
) − 1
4n2
= 2n − 2.5
2n2
≤ 2n − 3.5
n2
.
● We are left to analyze the case of ∣Is∣ ≥ 2, which turns to be trickier. Notice that
In(LIME) < sup
s∈S {∫t∈As n∑i=1LIME(s, t)i ⋅ ∣si − t∣dt − ∣Is∣ 14n2} , (6)
where the last inequality follows from the bound on optimal social cost, 1/4n. Due to the definition of LIME,
RHS of Eq. (6) = sup
s∈S
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩∑j∈Is ∫t∈(onj ,onj+1) mini∈s∖(onj ,onj+1) ∣si − t∣dt − ∣Is∣
1
4n2
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭ . (7)
Clearly, if under a strategy profile there are facilities outside the PIIs, the term inside the supremum can only decrease; thus, it
is suffice to consider strategy profiles with facilities inside PIIs only. Next,
Proposition C.1. Let s be a strategy profile, and let (a, b) be an interval such that s ∩ (a, b) = ∅. It holds that
∫ b
a
min
i∈[n] ∣si − t∣dt ≤ (b − a)mini∈[n] ∣si − a + b2 ∣ .
The proof of this proposition appears below. By invoking Proposition C.1 we have
Eq. (7) ≤ sup
s∈S ∑j∈Is 1n mini∈Is∖{j}(∣si − jn ∣ − 14n)≤ sup
s∈S ∑j∈Is 1n mini∈Is∖{j}(∣ in − jn ∣ + 12n − 14n) , (8)
where the last inequality is due to triangle inequality, since the distance between every facility si and the center of the interval( 2l−1
2n
, 2l+1
2n
) it relies in is at most half of the interval size. Since there is an onto mapping from S to 2[n−1] (as there n players
but n − 1 intervals),
Eq. (8) = max
D⊆[n−1] ∑j∈D 1n mini∈D∖{j}(∣ in − jn ∣ + 14n) = 1n2 maxD⊆2[n−1] ∑j∈D mini∈D∖{j}(∣i − j∣ + 14) . (9)
Next, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma C.1. For every D ⊆ [n − 1], it holds that
∑
j∈D mini∈D∖{j}(∣i − j∣ + 14) ≤ 2n − 3.5
The proof of this lemma appears below. By combining Lemma C.1 with Equation (9), we obtain
Eq. (9) ≤ 2n − 3.5
n2
. (10)
Overall, we conclude that In(LIME) < 2n−3.5n2 .
Proof of Proposition C.1. Let α such that α = arg minsi∈s ∣si − a+b2 ∣ for some α ≥ 0. Since s ∩ (a, b) = ∅, α ∉ (a, b) holds, so
assume w.l.o.g. that α ≥ b. We continue by highlighting two cases. In case all the users in (a, b) are served by the facility in α,
i.e., arg minsi∈s ∣si − t∣ = α for every t ∈ (a, b), we have
∫ b
a
min
i∈[n] ∣si − t∣dt = ∫ ba (α − t)dt = (b − a)α − (b2 − a22 ) = (b − a) (α − a + b2 ) .
Otherwise, if for some values of t ∈ (a, b) it holds that β = arg minsi∈s ∣si − t∣ for β ≠ α (and therefore β ≤ a), we have
∫ b
a
min
si∈s ∣si − t∣dt = ∫ ba min{∣α − t∣ , ∣β − t∣}dt < ∫ ba (α − t)dt,
which is identical to the previous case.
Proof of Lemma C.1. We solve the optimization problem by a reduction to graph problem. Consider the directed graph G =(V,E), where V = {v1, . . . , vn−1}, and define
E = ⋃
i∈[n−2]{(vi, vi+1), (vi+1, vi)} .
Next, observe that the function given in the lemma is equivalent to the selection of D ⊆ V as to maximize
f(D) def= ∑
vj∈D minvi∈D∖{vj}(∣i − j∣ + 14) = ∣D∣4 + ∑vj∈D minvi∈D∖{vj} ∣S(vi, vj)∣ ,
where S(vi, vj) is the set of edges corresponding to the shortest path from vi to vj . Let D∗ = {v1, vn−1}, and observe that
f(D∗) = ∣E∣ + 1
2
. In addition, notice that by selecting a vertex vi for i ∈ {2,3, . . . n − 2}, S(vi, vj) contains exactly one of{(vi, vi+1), (vi, vi−1)}. As a result, for every internal (i.e. one of {v2, . . . , vn−2}) D contains, it loses one edge from E; thus,
for every D of size greater than two (that must contain at least one of {v2, . . . , vn−2}),
f(D) ≤ ∣D∣
4
+ ∣E∣ − (∣D∣ − 2) = ∣E∣ − 3 ∣D∣
4
+ 2 ∣D∣>2< ∣E∣ < f(D∗).
This completes the proof of the lemma.
D Omitted proofs from Section 4
Proof of Proposition 1. This proposition is a special case of Proposition E.1.
Claim D.1. There is no neutral mediator such that
• (x, y) is a PNE for some x, y ∈ [0,1] such that x ≠ y
• For every z, (z, z) is not a PNE
Proof of Claim D.1. Assume by contradiction that (x, y) is a PNE; hence,
pi1(x, y) ≥ pi1(y, y) Neutrality= 1
2
.
Due to symmetry and the game being constant sum, pi1(x, y) = pi2(x, y) = 12 . In addition, neutrality suggests that pi1(y, y) = 12
and due to the second condition (y, y) in not a PNE; thus, there exists x′ such that
pi1(x′, y) > pi1(y, y) = 1
2
= pi1(x, y),
hinting that (x, y) is not a PNE, and we obtained a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let s∗ def= (q2i−1/2n)ni=1. The proof consists of two steps: first, we show that s∗ is a PNE; then, we show it is
the unique PNE of the induce game.
Step 1: Notice that the facility in q1/2n obtains a payoff of exactly 1n , with a user mass of the interval (q1/2n, q3/2n) arriving
from the right (see Line 5 in Algorithm 2), which is 1
2n
, and a user mass of 1
2n
arriving from the left. The same applies for the
facility located in q2n−1/2n. In addition, for every i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, the facility located in q2i−1/2n gets half of the user mass in(q2i−3/2n, q2i−1/2n), and half of the user mass of in (q2i−1/2n, q2i+1/2n). Overall, each player gets exactly 1n .
Consider a deviation of player j for some arbitrary j. If player j would deviate to a point in [0, q1/2n) or (q2n−1/n,1], she
could get at most 1
2n
+ 
n2
(the term 
n2
arriving from the case j = 1 or j = n). If she would deviate to a point in (q2i−1/2n, q2i+1/2n)
for some i ∈ [n − 1], she would get at most 1
2n
+ 
n2
. Finally, if deviates to a point q2i−1/2n for some i ∈ [n], her payoff could be
at most 3
4n
+ 
n2
. Consequently, she has no beneficial deviation. Overall, we showed that s∗ is a PNE.
Step 2: Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) be an arbitrary strategy profile such that w.l.o.g. s1 ≤ ⋯ ≤ sn, s ≠ s∗, and assume by contradiction
that s is in equilibrium. First, we show that
Lemma D.1. Consider G(n,GLIME) for any n ≥ 2. If s is an equilibrium profile, then sj ∉ (q 2i−1
2n
, q 2i+1
2n
) for every j ∈ [n]
and i ∈ [n − 1].
The proof of the Lemma D.1 follows closely the proof of Lemma 2, by replacing oni with its counterpart for non-uniform
distributions, q 2i−1
2n
; hence, it is omitted. This equivalence stems from the proof of Lemma 2 considering beneficial deviations
to ∪ni=1{oni }, which yield the same payoffs as deviations to ∪ni=1{q2i−1/2n} under a non-uniform distribution.
Next, by reiterating the steps given in the proof of Theorem 1 and replacing oni with q 2i−12n , we show that under s ∩ s∗ = s.
Namely, we show that if s is a PNE then the facilities’ locations under s are a subset of ∪ni=1{q2i−1/2n}, the locations selected in
s∗. The proof is completed by showing that each location in ∪ni=1{q2i−1/2n} is selected by exactly one player, which is also the
final step in the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the profile s where half of the players select 1
2n
and the other half select 2n−1
n
. It holds that
SC(GLIME,s) − SC(NIME,s)
= 1
2
(n − 1
n
)2 − (1
2
− 1
2n
)2
= 1
2
− 1
n
+ 1
2n2
− (1
4
− 1
2n
+ 1
4n2
)
= 1
4
− 1
2n
+ 1
4n2
.
Corollary 2. Consider G(n,LIME, g) for n ≥ 3. The social cost of the unique PNE is
1
2
(q21/2n + q22n−1/2n + n−1∑
i=1(q2i+1/2n − q2i−1/2n)2) .
For the uniform user distribution, the social cost is 2n−1/4n2, which is relatively high when compared to social cost of LIME.
Nevertheless, recall that GLIME is applicable for any general distribution.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let oni = 2i−12n for i ∈ [n], and denote I def= ∪i∈[n−1] (oni , oni+1). Recall that
SC(GLIME,s) − SC(NIME,s) = ∫ 1
0
( n∑
i=1GLIME(s, t)i ⋅ ∣si − t∣ − mini′∈[n] ∣si′ − t∣)dt.
For every t ∉ I it holds that
n∑
i=1GLIME(s, t)i ⋅ ∣si − t∣ = mini′∈[n] ∣si′ − t∣ ,
since GLIME directs it to its nearest facility under s; hence, it suffices to consider users in for which GLIME operates non-
optimally, i.e. analyze f that is define as follows:
f(s) def= ∫
I
( n∑
i=1GLIME(s, t)i ⋅ ∣si − t∣ − mini′∈[n] ∣si′ − t∣)dt.
Algorithm 3: Configurable Limited Intervention Mediator
Input: A strategy profile s, user t and a hyper-parameter λ
Output: A location in s
1 if ∃i ∈ {1, n − 1} such that t ∈ ( i
n
− λ, i
n
+ λ) then
2 l ← s ∩ [0, i
n
− λ] ,r ← s ∩ [ i
n
+ λ,1]
3 if l ≠ ∅ and r ≠ ∅ then
4 return NIME(l ∪ r, t)
5 else if l ≠ ∅ or r ≠ ∅ then
6 w.p. 1 −  return NIME(l ∪ r, t), otherwise return random(s, t)
7 else
// all facilities are inside that interval
8 return NIME(s, t)
9 else
// t is outside the intervals
10 return NIME(s, t)
In addition, let L(s, t) denote the distance t covers when GLIME sends him to its nearest facility from the left, and similarly
let R(s, t) denote the distance when he is send by GLIME to the right; thus,
f(s) = ∫
I
(1
2
L(s, t) + 1
2
R(s, t) − min
i′∈[n] ∣si′ − t∣)dt. (11)
For every i ∈ [n − 1] and a user t ∈ (oni , oni+1) it holds that
1
2
L(s, t) + 1
2
R(s, t) = 1
2
L(s, i
n
) + 1
2
R(s, i
n
) ;
hence,
f(s) = n−1∑
i=1
1
2n
(L(s, i
n
) +R(s, i
n
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term I
−∫
I
(min
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term II
. (12)
Next, we analyze the two terms in Equation (12):
• Notice that
term I = n−1∑
i=1
1
2n
(L(s, i
n
) +R(s, i
n
)) ≤ n − 1
2n
,
where equality holds only if s ∩ {0,1} = s.
• Due to Claim 1, we know that
term II = ∫
I
(min
i′∈[n] ∣si′ − t∣)dt ≥ ∣I ∣ 14n,
where equality holds only under the (unique, up to renaming the players) strategy profile s0 under which the facilities are
located in the optimal locations w.r.t. to [on1 , onn]. In particular, s0 ∩ {0,1} ≠ s0, so under s0 term I is strictly less than its
bound.
Combining what we know on terms I and II, we conclude that for every profile s
f(s) < n − 1
2n
− n − 1
n
⋅ 1
4n
= 1
2
− 3
4n
+ 1
4n2
, (13)
which is less than the lower bound obtained for DICT (see Lemma 1).
E Configurable limited intervention mediator
In this section we propose a mediator that uncovers low social cost with low intervention cost. The mediator, which we term
Configurable Limited Intervention Mediator or CLIME(λ) for abbreviation, is given in Algorithm 3. CLIME(λ) operates
similarly to LIME, but does two things differently. First, it contains one PII if n = 2 (a two-player game), and two PIIs
otherwise. Second, it receives as input a hyper-parameter, λ, which limits the length of the PIIs. This allows CLIME(λ) to tune
the trade-off between low social cost and low intervention cost. When we discuss properties of the CLIME(λ) mediator that
hold for general λ, we omit λ and refer to the mediator as CLIME. We begin by analyzing the two-player game, and then move
to general games.
E.1 The two-player game
In this subsection we formally analyze G(2,CLIME(λ)). Since CLIME is neutral (see Subsection 4.1), Claim D.1 suggests
that it either induces a game with a symmetric PNE, or a game with no PNE at all. We now show that the former is correct.
Proposition E.1. Consider G(2,CLIME(λ)) for 0 < λ ≤ 1
4
. A strategy profile s = (s1, s2) is a PNE if and only if s1, s2 ∈{ 1
2
− λ, 1
2
+ λ}.
In particular, by setting λ = 1
4
we recover the results obtained for G(2,LIME) in Proposition 1. Next, denote the set of PNE
by E def= { 1
2
− λ, 1
2
+ λ}2. By a simple calculation, one can see that
Corollary 3. Consider G = G(2,CLIME(λ)) for 0 < λ ≤ 1
4
. for every e ∈ E, it holds that SC(CLIME(λ),e) ∈ { 1
4
− λ +
2λ2, 1
4
+ λ2}.
Consequently, one can view that the best and worst social cost as a function of λ,
min
e∈E SC(CLIME(λ),e) = 14 − λ + 2λ2, maxe∈E SC(CLIME(λ),e) = 14 + λ2
Notably, the best social cost is 1
8
, obtained for λ = 1
4
. However, the social cost can also deteriorate (when compared toNIME),
and is 5
16
in the worst case. This does not come as a surprise, since for λ = 1
4
the games G(2,CLIME( 1
4
)) and G(2,LIME) are
strategically equivalent.
We proceed to analyzing the intervention cost of CLIME.
Proposition E.2. It holds that In(CLIME(λ)) ≤ λ − λ2.
Now, the trade-off between the minimal social cost in equilibrium and the intervention cost can be quantified as follows,
min
0<λ≤ 14{mine∈E SC(CLIME(λ),e) + c ⋅ In(CLIME(λ))},
where c is a penalty for intervening. Equivalently,
min
0<λ≤ 14 {14 + (c − 1)λ + (2 − c)λ2} ;
thus, CLIME(λ) is applicable whenever the mediator designer gives more weight to improving the social cost (low values of c,
i.e. c < 1). On the other hand, if c ≥ 1, intervention is not desired, and the designer would be better off with adopting NIME as
a mediator.
E.2 Multi-player games
We now focus on G(n,CLIME(λ)) for n ≥ 3. First, we show a negative result for CLIME for n = 3.
Proposition E.3. Consider G(3,CLIME(λ)). For every 0 < λ < 1
6
, there is no PNE.
As it turns out, the equilibrium structure varies for n ≥ 4. As mentioned above, we do not study it in this paper but rather
exemplify some cases. Before we do so, we give a crude bound on the intervention cost of games with n ≥ 3.
Proposition E.4. For n ≥ 3, it holds that I(CLIME) ≤ 4λ.
We now showcase a few examples.
Four players Consider G(4,CLIME( 1
8
)). The strategy profile s = ( 1
8
, 3
8
, 5
8
, 7
8
) is the unique PNE (up to renaming the play-
ers) of this game, with a social cost of SC(CLIME,s) = 1
16
, i.e., the optimal social cost in a four-player game. In fact, this
equilibrium structure extends to G(4,CLIME(λ)) with any λ ≤ 1
8
. See Figure 2 for illustration.
Five players For n = 5, and unlike n = 4, CLIME(λ) may induce a game with several equilibria, depending on the value
of λ. For example, if λ = 1
10
the socially optimal locations (i.e., 1
10
, 3
10
, 5
10
, 7
10
, 9
10
) are the unique equilibrium. However, when
λ = 1
40
, agglomerating on the two distant endpoints of the PIIs can be in equilibrium. See Figure 2 for illustration.
Games with n ≥ 6 See Figure 4 for illustration. Here too, several equilibria may exist. To conclude, although not always the
case, CLIME illustrate in a constructive manner an approach for trading some social cost for getting lower intervention cost.
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Figure 2: Two PNE profiles in four-player games with CLIME. Sub-figure (a) corresponds to G(4,CLIME(λ)) with λ = 1
8
, and
Sub-figure (b) corresponds to G(4,CLIME(λ)) with λ = 1
12
. Each profile is the unique PNE of the game induces by CLIME(λ)
with the corresponding λ.
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Figure 3: Two PNE profiles in five-player games with CLIME. Sub-figure (a) corresponds to G(4,CLIME(λ)) with λ = 1
10
, and
Sub-figure (b) corresponds to G(4,CLIME(λ)) with λ = 1
40
. Note that in Sub-figure 3.(b) there are paired facilities, unlike the
examples given for LIME.
F Proofs of Section E
The following claim will be useful in what follows.
Claim F.1. Consider G(2,CLIME(λ)) for 0 < λ ≤ 1
4
. If a strategy profile s is a PNE, then s ∩ ( 1
2
− λ, 1
2
+ λ) = ∅.
Proof of Claim F.1. Assume the claim does not hold, and w.l.o.g. let s1 ≤ s2. If ∣s ∩ ( 12 − λ, 12 + λ)∣ = 2, then by deviating to
s′2 = 12 + λ her payoff would increase, since
pi2(s1, s′2) = (1 − 2)2λ + λ2 + 12 − λ = 12 + λ(1 − 2) <1> 12 = pi2(s);
hence, s cannot be in equilibrium. Otherwise, w.l.o.g. s ∩ ( 1
2
− λ, 1
2
+ λ) = s2. There are two cases:
1. If s1 = 12 − λ, then pi2(s) < 12 (as previously explained); thus, player 2 has a beneficial deviation
2. s1 < 12 − λ, then by deviating to s′1 = 12 − λ player 1 would improve her payoff, since pi1(s) < pi1(s′1, s2).
Under both cases the players have beneficial deviations; therefore, s is not in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition E.1. First, by a simple case analysis one can show that every profile in { 1
2
−λ, 1
2
+λ}2 is a PNE, since the
players do not have beneficial deviations. On the other hand, let s = (x, y) such that (x, y) ∉ { 1
2
− λ, 1
2
+ λ}, and assume by
contradiction that (x, y) is a PNE. In addition, w.l.o.g. assume that x ∉ { 1
2
− λ, 1
2
+ λ}. Due to Claim F.1, we know that x and y
are outside ( 1
2
− λ, 1
2
+ λ). If x ≠ y, player 1 can move her facility towards that of player 2, and improve her payoff. Otherwise,
if x = y, by deviating to one of {x − δ, x + δ} for a small δ > 0, player 1 can obtain a payoff arbitrarily close to max{x,1 − x},
which is greater than 1
2
since x ∉ { 1
2
− λ, 1
2
+ λ}.
Proof of Corollary 3. For sworst = ( 12 − λ, 12 − λ) (or equivalently, for s = ( 12 + λ, 12 + λ) ),
SC(CLIME, sworst) = (1
2
− λ)2 1
2
+ (1
2
+ λ)2 1
2
= 1
4
+ λ2
For sbest = ( 12 − λ, 12 + λ) it hold that
SC(CLIME, sbest) = (1
2
− λ)2 + λ2 = 1
4
− λ + 2λ2
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Figure 4: Examples of PNE profile of G(n,CLIME(λ)), for various values of n and λ. In Sub-figure 4.(a) n = 6 and λ = 1
12
, in
Sub-figure 4.(b) n = 6 and λ = 1
72
, and in Sub-figure 4.(c) and n = 10 and λ = 1
20
.
Proof of Proposition E.2. Let s = (x, y), and let
f (x, y) def= SC (CLIME, (x, y)) − SC (NIME, (x, y)) .
We are interested in I2(CLIME) = sup
x,y∈[0,1] f(x, y) (14)
Let I def= ( 1
2
− λ, 1
2
+ λ), and observe that if x, y ∈ I , then due to Line 8 in Algorithm 3 it holds that CLIME(x, y, t) =
NIME(x, y, t) for every user t. Moreover, if x, y ∉ I , CLIME(x, y, t) = NIME(x, y, t) holds for every t as well due to Line 10.
Consequently,
Eq. (14) = sup
x∉I,y∈I f(x, y) = supx≤ 12−λ,y∈I f(x, y).
where the last equality is due to symmetry. Let x, y such that x ≤ 1
2
− λ and y ∈ I , and notice that
f(x, y) = ∫
I
(∣t − x∣ −min{∣t − y∣ , ∣t − x∣})dt. (15)
Next, we define Iy(x, y) to be the set of users in I that are closer to y than to x, i.e., Iy(x, y) = {t ∈ I ∣ ∣t − y∣ ≤ ∣t − x∣}, and let
Ix(x, y) = I ∖ Iy(x, y). We can rephrase Equation (15) as follows
f(x, y) = ∫
Ix(x,y) (∣t − x∣ −min{∣t − y∣ , ∣t − x∣})dt + ∫Iy(x,y) (∣t − x∣ −min{∣t − y∣ , ∣t − x∣})dt= ∫
Iy(x,y) (∣t − x∣ − ∣t − y∣)dt. (16)
We claim that f is monotonically decreasing in x when y is fixed. This holds not only because the integrand in the last term in
Equation (16) is monotonically decreasing in x when y is fixed, but also since the set Iy(x, y) monotonically decreases in x.
As a result,
Eq. (14) = sup
y∈I f(0, y). (17)
Since λ ≤ 1
4
, under every profile (0, y) such that y ∈ I , NIME directs every t ∈ I to y. In contrast, under every profile (0, y)
such that y ∈ I , CLIME directs every t ∈ I to x; thus, by a direct calculation we conclude that for every y ∈ I
f(0, y) = (2λ)2
2
+ 2λ(1
2
− λ) − 1
2
((y − 1
2
+ λ)2 + (1
2
+ λ − y)2) . (18)
Moreover,
df(0, y)
dy
= −1
2
(2(y − 1
2
+ λ) − 2(1
2
+ λ − y)) = 1 − 2y, d2f(0, y)
dy2
= −2 < 0; (19)
hence, f(0, y) is concave in y, and attains its maximum in y = 1
2
. Since
f (0, 1
2
) = (2λ)2
2
+ 2λ(1
2
− λ) − 1
2
(λ2 + λ2) = λ − λ2,
due to Equation (17) it holds that I2(CLIME) = λ − λ2
This concludes the proof of the Proposition.
Claim F.2. Consider G(3,CLIME(λ)) for 0 < λ < 1
6
. If s ∩ (( 1
3
− λ, 1
3
+ λ) ∪ ( 2
3
− λ, 2
3
+ λ)) ≠ ∅ then s is not a PNE.
Proof of Claim F.2. Assume the claim does not hold, and w.l.o.g. s1 ≤ s2 ≤ s3. We show by exhaustive case analysis that s is
not a PNE.
1. If ∣s ∩ ( 1
3
− λ, 1
3
+ λ) ∣ = 3: Player 1 obtains a payoff of less than 1
3
+ λ, but by deviating to 1
3
+ λ she could get at least( 2
3
+ λ) (1 − ); hence, she has a beneficial deviation (deviating to the left).
2. If ∣s ∩ ( 1
3
− λ, 1
3
+ λ) ∣ = 2: In case s1, s2 ∈ ( 13 − λ, 13 + λ) and s3 > 13 + λ, player 3 has a beneficial deviation. If s3 = 13 + λ
then player 1 moves to 1
2
and the analysis is similar to Case 1. Similar argument applies in case s2, s3 ∈ ( 13 − λ, 13 + λ).
3. If ∣s ∩ ( 1
3
− λ, 1
3
+ λ) ∣ = 1: In case s1 ∈ ( 13 − λ, 13 + λ), we have two sub-cases:
• if s2 = 13 + λ, player 1 can improve her payoff by deviating to 13 − λ.
• if s2 > 13 + λ, player 1 can improve her payoff by deviating to 13 + λ.
Else, if s3 ∈ ( 13 − λ, 13 + λ) player 1 can improve her payoff by deviating to 13 + λ.
Finally, if s2 ∈ ( 13 − λ, 13 + λ) then (s1, s3) must be ( 13 − λ, 13 + λ), since otherwise the corresponding player has a beneficial
deviation. However, if s1 = 13 − λ, she can improve her payoff by deviating to 13 + λ + δ for small enough δ.
The analysis for ( 2
3
− λ, 2
3
+ λ) is symmetric and hence omitted. We conclude that s is not a PNE.
Proof of Proposition E.3. Assume w.l.o.g. that s1 ≤ s2 ≤ s3. According to Claim F.2, if s is a PNE then the PIIs are free of
facilities. As for the other alternatives,
1. s1 = s2 = s3. Every player gets a payoff of 13 . However, by deviating to one of { 12 − δ, 12 + δ}, a player can get more than that;
hence, there exist beneficial deviations.
2. If s1 < s2 < s3: In case s2 /∈ { 13 +λ, 23 +λ} then player 1 can deviate to s′1 = s2−δ for small enough δ and improve her payoff.
Else, if s2 = 13 + λ, player 3 has a beneficial deviation. Otherwise, if s2 = 23 + λ, player 1 has a beneficial deviation.
3. Assume w.l.o.g. s1 = s2 < s3 (symmetrically for s1 < s2 = s3): If s1 /∈ { 13 − λ, 23 − λ} then player 3 has a beneficial deviation
to s′3 = s1 + δ, for small enough δ. If s1 = 13 −λ, then unless s3 = 13 +λ player 3 can improve her payoff by deviating to 13 +λ.
However, if s3 = 13 + λ, player 1 can deviate to 12 and improve her payoff. Similar argument holds for s1 = 23 − λ.
Proof of Proposition E.4. Denote
I
def= ( 1
n
− 1
λ
,
1
n
+ 1
λ
) ∪ (n − 1
n
− 1
λ
,
n − 1
n
+ 1
λ
) .
Observe that for every user t /∈ I it holds that (See Line 10 in Algorithm 3)
n∑
i=1CLIME(s, t)i ⋅ ∣si − t∣ = mini′∈[n] ∣si′ − t∣ ;
thus, In(CLIME) = sup
s∈S {SC(CLIME,s) − SC(NIME,s)}
= sup
s∈S {∫I ( n∑i=1CLIME(s, t)i ⋅ ∣si − t∣ − mini′∈[n] ∣si′ − t∣)dt.}< sup
s∈S {∫I 1dt}= 4λ.
